Livy on the Battle of Cannae (216bc)


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Polybius, Book 3, Chapters 110-118

Livy, Book 22, Chapters 44-52

2. Aemilius, seeing that the district round was flat and treeless, was opposed to attacking the enemy there as they were superior in cavalry, his advice being to lure them on by advancing into a country where the battle would be decided rather by the infantry... 

3. As Terentius, owing to his inexperience, was of the contrary opinion, difficulties and disputes arose between the generals, one of the most pernicious things possible.

44.1. In tracking the path of the Carthaginian army, the consuls had reconnoitred the route with considerable care.

4. Terentius was in command next day — the two Consuls according to the usual practice commanding on alternate days — and he broke up his camp and advanced with the object of approaching the enemy in spite of Aemilius's strong protests and efforts to prevent him.  5. Hannibal met him with his light-armed troops and cavalry and surprising him while still on the march disordered the Romans much.  6. They met, however, the first charge by advancing some of their heavy infantry, and afterwards sending forwards also their javelineers and cavalry got the better in the whole engagement, as the Carthaginians had no considerable covering force, while they themselves had some companies of their legions fighting mixed with the light-armed troops.  7. The fall of night now made them draw off from each other, the attack of the Carthaginians not having had the success they hoped. 


8. Next day, Aemilius, who neither judged it advisable to fight nor could now withdraw the army in safety, encamped with two-thirds of it on the bank of the river Aufidus.  9. This is the only river which traverses the Apennines, the long chain of mountains separating all the Italian streams, those on one side descending to the Tyrrhenian sea and those on the other to the Adriatic. The Aufidus, however, runs right through these mountains, having its source on the side of Italy turned to the Tyrrhenian Sea and falling into the Adriatic.  10. For the remaining portion of his army he fortified a position on the farther side of the river, to the east of the ford, at a distance of about ten stadia from his own camp and rather more from that of the enemy,  11. intending thus to cover the foraging parties from his main camp across the river and harass those of the Carthaginians.

Once they reached Cannae and had a clear view of the Carthaginian position, they divided the army as before and established two separate fortified camps, about the same distant apart as at Gereonium.

44.2. The river Aufidus flowed between the two camps and allowed fatigue parties to draw water as opportunity offered; but there was always the risk of an enemy attack.  44.3. However, the smaller Roman camp was situated on the far side of the Aufidus, and this made the business of collecting water a much easier proposition, since the opposite bank had no enemy guard posts along it.

44.4. The terrain was ideally suited for a cavalry engagement, and Hannibal hoped that the consuls would offer him an opportunity to fight one. So he drew up his battle lines and tried to provoke his opponents with small assaults by his Numidians.


44.5. Once again disorder broke out in the Roman camp, with the troops proving mutinous and the consuls incapable of agreement. Lucius Aemilius Paullus (who was Varro’s colleague in the consulship) kept reminding Varro of what had been the results of the rash leadership of Sempronius and Flaminius; Varro sarcastically threw back at him Fabius’ “wonderful” example, as a cowardly and un-enterprising general,  44.6. calling on gods and men alike to bear witness that it was not his fault that Hannibal had captured the whole of Italy and was now treating it as his private property. He complained bitterly that thanks to his colleague his hands were tied; that the soldiers were furious at being disarmed, even though they were fired up and spoiling for a fight.  44.7. Paullus retorted that, if the legions suffered a defeat as a result of being treacherously ordered forward into an idiotic battle for which they were unprepared, then he would certainly not be to blame, though of course he would stand with them and share the risks, whatever the result. He only hoped that those whose tongues were quick to utter brave words, would show themselves no less courageous by their deeds once battle was joined.

[111  Hannibal now encouraged his men by a speech, in which he promised his men: ‘”Your victory will make you at once masters of all Italy, and through this one battle you will be freed from your present toil, you will possess yourselves of all the vast wealth of Rome, and will be lords and masters of all men and all things.”’]

112  1 Next day [Hannibal] ordered all his troops to look to their persons and their accoutrements,

45.1. While in the Roman camp time was being wasted on such squabbles instead of tactical planning, Hannibal began to pull back to his camp the troops which he had kept lined up and ready for action during the greater part of the day. 

and on the day following he drew up his army along the river with the evident intention of giving battle as soon as possible.  2. Aemilius was not pleased with the ground, and seeing that the Carthaginians would soon have to shift their camp in order to obtain supplies, kept quiet, after securing his two camps by covering forces. 3. Hannibal, after waiting for some time without anyone coming out to meet him, withdrew again the rest of his army into their intrenchments, but sent out the Numidians to intercept the water-bearers from the lesser Roman camp.  4. When the Numidians came up to the actual palisade of the camp and prevented the men from watering, not only was this a further stimulus to Terentius, but the soldiers displayed great eagerness for battle and ill brooked further delay.  5. For nothing is more trying to men in general than prolonged suspense, but when the issue has once been decided we make a shift to endure patiently all that men regard as the depth of misery.

45.2. Meanwhile he despatched his Numidian cavalry to launch an attack on the fatigue parties from the smaller Roman camp, who were drawing water from the river.  45.3. The fatigue party was little more than a disorganised rabble, and the cavalry sent them into a noisy and panic stricken flight before they had even ridden across the river and onto the further bank. So they galloped on up to the guard post sited in front of the camp’s defensive ditch (vallum), and almost as far as the gates of the camp itself.  45.4. To find that even a Roman camp could be thrown into such confusion by a small band of irregular cavalry was a keenly felt disgrace. The only thing that stopped the Romans from immediately crossing the river and forming up for battle was the fact that Aemilius Paullus held the supreme command for that day.

6. When the news reached Rome that the armies were encamped opposite each other and that engagements between the outposts occurred every day, there was the utmost excitement and fear in the city, as most people dreaded the result owing to their frequent previous reverses, and foresaw and anticipated in imagination the consequences of total defeat. All the oracles that had ever been delivered to them were in men's mouths, every temple and every house was full of signs and prodigies, so that vows, sacrifices, supplicatory processions and litanies pervaded the town. For in seasons of danger the Romans are much given to propitiating both gods and men, and there is nothing at such times in rites of the kind that they regard as unbecoming or beneath their dignity.


113  1. Next day it was Terentius' turn to take the command, and just after sunrise he began to move his forces out of both camps.  2. Crossing the river with those from the larger camp he at once put them in order of battle, drawing up those from the other camp next to them in the same line, the whole army facing south.  3. He stationed the Roman cavalry close to the river on the right wing and the foot next to them in the same line, placing the maniples closer together than was formerly the usage and making the depth of each many times exceed its front.  4. The allied horse he drew up on his left wing, and in front of the whole force at some distance he placed his light-armed troops.  5. The whole army, including the allies, numbered about eighty thousand foot and rather more than six thousand horse.

45.5. They had in fact drawn lots for it, and so on the next day, it was Varro’s turn for command.

Without a word to his colleague, he ordered the standards to be deployed and the troops drawn up for battle. Then he led them across the river, with Paullus following in his footsteps not because he approved of the plan, but because he felt he had to help where he could.  45.6. They crossed the river and linked up with the forces from the smaller camp and then deployed their forces, with the Roman cavalry on the right wing (the side nearest the river) and the infantry next to them.  45.7. The far left wing was held by the allied cavalry, with their infantry next to them on the inside, meeting up at the centre with the Roman legionaries. The javelin throwers from the rest of the light-armed auxiliary forces made up the front line.  45.8. The consuls commanded the two wings, Terentius Varro the left and Aemilius Paullus the right. The centre was commanded by Geminus Servilius.

Hannibal at the same time sent his slingers and pikemen over the river and stationed them in front, and leading the rest of his forces out of camp he crossed the stream in two places and drew them up opposite the enemy. On his left close to the river he placed his Spanish and Celtic horse facing the Roman cavalry, next these half his heavy-armed Africans, then the Spanish and Celtic infantry, and after them the other half of the Africans, and finally, on his right wing, his Numidian horse. After thus drawing up his whole army in a straight line, he took the central companies of the Spaniards and Celts and advanced with them, keeping rest of them in contact with these companies, but gradually falling off, so as to produce a crescent-shaped formation, the line of the flanking companies growing thinner as it was prolonged, his object being to employ the Africans as a reserve force and to begin the action with the Spaniards and Celts.

114  1. The Africans were armed in the Roman fashion, Hannibal having equipped them with the choicest of the arms captured in the previous battles. The shields of the Spaniards and Celts were very similar, but they swords were entirely different, those of the Spaniards thrusting with as deadly effect as they cut, but the Gaulish sword being only able to slash and requiring a long sweep to do so. As they were drawn up in alternate companies, the Gauls naked and the Spaniards in short tunics bordered with purple, their national dress, they presented a strange and impressive appearance. The Carthaginian cavalry numbered about ten thousand, and their infantry, including the Celts, did not much exceed forty thousand.

The Roman right wing was under the command of Aemilius, the left under that of Terentius, and the centre under the Consuls of the previous year, Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius. Hasdrubal commanded the Carthaginian left, Hanno the right, and Hannibal himself with his brother Mago the centre. Since the Roman army, as I said, faced south and the Carthaginians north, they were neither of them inconvenienced by the rising sun.

46.1. At dawn Hannibal sent his Balearic slingers and light-armed troops out ahead, and then crossed the river with the main body of his army. He deployed them in position as they crossed,  46.2. with Gallic and Spanish cavalry on the left wing, near the river bank, facing the Roman cavalry,  46.3. and the Numidian cavalry on the right wing. In the centre he stationed his infantry, strengthening the whole formation by putting his African troops on both flanks, with Gauls and Spanish soldiers placed between.  46.4. You would have thought that the Africans were an almost totally Roman battle line. Their weaponry consisted mainly of the spoils of Trasimene, but also of Trebia.  46.5. The Gauls and Spanish troops had shields that were broadly similar, but the swords differed in size and design, the former having long swords which had no points, the Spanish short and pointed ones, since their fighting technique was to stab rather than slash their enemy. The effect of these tribesmen was uniquely terrifying, both for their giant physique and ferocious looks.  46.6. The Gauls were naked from the waist up; the Spanish, with their linen tunics edged with purple, presented an extraordinary line of dazzling white. When fully deployed, their overall numbers came to 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.  46.7. Of their commanders, Hasdrubal led the left wing, Maharbal the right, while Hannibal held the centre, with his brother Mago.

46.8. The Romans faced south, the Carthaginians north, and fortunately for both, the early morning sun as a result was shining obliquely across both the battle-lines, possibly because they had deliberately taken up positions to achieve this, possibly by sheer chance.  46.9. But a south-easterly wind, which the locals call the Volturnus, sprang up and rolled heavy dust clouds into the eyes of the Romans, thus seriously obscuring visibility for them.

115  1. The advanced guards were the first to come into action, and at first when only the light infantry were engaged neither side had the advantage;

47.1. With a great yell the auxiliaries charged, and with the clash of light-armed troops, the battle began.

2. but when the Spanish and Celtic horse on the left wing came into collision with the Roman cavalry, the struggle that ensued was truly barbaric;  3. for there were none of the normal wheeling evolutions, but having once met they dismounted and fought man to man.  4. The Carthaginians finally got the upper hand, killed most of the enemy in the mellay, all the Romans fighting with desperate bravery, and began to drive the rest along the river, cutting them down mercilessly, and it was now that the heavy infantry on each side took the place of the light-armed troops and met.

Then the Gallic and Spanish cavalry on the Carthaginian left engaged the Roman right, though it bore little resemblance to a normal cavalry engagement.  47.2. The cavalry squadrons had to meet each other head-on, since with the river on one side and the infantry lines on the other there was no room for the more usual mobile manoeuvres.  47.3. For both sides it became a hand-to-hand struggle; the horses were jammed together and unable to move, so their riders had to resort to grabbing their enemies and trying to drag each other from their saddles. It became, in effect, almost entirely an infantry battle, ferocious while it lasted, which was not very long. The Roman cavalry were driven back and retreated.

5. For a time the Spaniards and Celts kept their ranks and struggled bravely with the Romans, but soon, borne down by the weight of the legions, they gave way and fell back, breaking up the crescent.  6. The Roman maniples, pursuing them furiously, easily penetrated the enemy's front, since the Celts were deployed in a thin line while they themselves had crowded up from the wings to the centre where the fighting was going on.  7. For the centres and wings did not come into action simultaneously, but the centres first, as the Celts were drawn up in a crescent and a long way in advance of their wings, the convex face of the crescent being turned towards the enemy.  8. The Romans, however, following up the Celts and pressing on to the centre and that part of the enemy's line which was giving way, progressed so far that they now had the heavy-armed Africans on both of their flanks. 
9. Hereupon the Africans on the right wing facing to the left and then beginning from the right charged upon the enemy's flank,  10. while those on the left faced to the right and dressing by the left, did the same, the situation itself indicating to them how to act.
11. The consequence was that, as Hannibal had designed, the Romans, straying too far in pursuit of the Celts, were caught between the two divisions of the enemy,  12. and they now no longer kept their compact formation but turned singly or in companies to deal with the enemy who was falling on their flanks.

47.4. As the cavalry engagement came to and end, the infantry battle began. At first the lines were evenly matched in strength and resolution, while the lines of Gauls and Spanish troops held firm.

47.5. But at last the Romans drove back the enemy’s wedge formation, which projected forward from their main line of troops but lacked the weight and density needed to withstand them, as they attacked across the whole front with a greater depth of forces.  47.6. The Carthaginians were driven back and began to withdraw nervously, while the Romans pressed on forward, maintaining the impetus of their attack and driving through the enemy line, which was now in headlong and panic stricken flight. This brought the Romans up against the centre of the Carthaginian position, and then, finding little resistance, against the African reserves.  47.7. These troops were positioned on both wings, which were drawn back somewhat from the projecting central wedge held by the Gauls and Spanish soldiers.  47.8. As the wedge was driven back it came level with the main lines of the Carthaginians central position. As they continued to withdraw, the centre of their line became concave, while the African troops on the two wings formed a pair of projecting horns, as it were, gradually enclosing the Roman troops as they charged unthinkingly on against the centre. The Carthaginians rapidly extended their wings and closed in on their opponents from behind.  47.9. The Romans were now in trouble: their initially successful first assault on the fleeing Gauls and Spaniards had to be abandoned, as they turned to face a new wave of attacks from the Africans behind them. The battle became an unequal struggle for them; they were totally surrounded, and though exhausted, were now compelled to face fresh and vigorous opponents.

116  1 Aemilius, though he had been on the right wing from the outset and had taken part in the cavalry action, was still safe and sound; but wishing to act up to what he had said in his address to the troops, and to be present himself at the fighting, and seeing that the decision of the battle lay mainly with the legions, he rode along to the centre of the whole line, where he not only threw himself personally into the combat and exchanged blows with the enemy but kept cheering on and exhorting his men. Hannibal, who had been in this part of the field since the commencement of the battle, did likewise.


5 The Numidians meanwhile on the right wing, attacking the cavalry opposite them on the Roman left, neither gained any great advantage nor suffered any serious loss owing to their peculiar mode of fighting, but they kept the enemy's cavalry out of action by drawing them off and attacking them from all sides at once.
6. Hasdrubal, having by this time cut up very nearly all the enemy's cavalry by the river, came up from the left to help the Numidians, and now the Roman allied horse, seeing that they were going to be charged by him, broke and fled.

48.1. On the Roman left wing, where their allied cavalry faced the Numidians, battle was now joined, somewhat half-heartedly at first, thanks to a typically piece of Punic deceit.  48.2. About 500 Numidians, had concealed swords under their tunics, as well as carrying their normal armour and weaponry. They now pretended to desert.  48.3. Leaving their own lines, they rode up to the Romans with their shields slung behind their backs, and then suddenly leapt from their horses, threw down their weapons and shields at their opponents’ feet, and having been taken into the Roman lines, were duly passed back to the rear and told to remain there. As the battle developed in every quarter, they stayed there quietly. But when everyone’s hearts and minds were completely focused on the wider struggle,  48.4. they grabbed their shields, which had been left scattered everywhere among the heaps of corpses, and launched an attack on the Romans from behind, stabbing them in the back, slicing their hamstrings, and inflicting massive slaughter and even greater panic and disorder.

Hasdrubal at this juncture appears to have acted with great skill and prudence; for in view of the fact that the Numidians were very numerous and most efficient and formidable when in pursuit of a flying foe he left them to deal with the Roman cavalry and led his squadrons on to where the infantry were engaged with the object of supporting the Africans. Attacking the Roman legions in the rear and delivering repeated charges at various points all at once, he raised the spirits of the Africans and cowed and dismayed the Romans.

48.5. In one section of the Roman battle line there was now panic stricken flight; in another, an obstinate determination to continuing fighting against all the odds. Hasdrubal, who commanded that section of the Carthaginian line, realised that the Numidians were fighting somewhat half-heartedly, so he withdrew them from the battle and sent them in pursuit of the fugitives who were scattering in every direction. To replace them he sent the Gauls and Spanish infantry to join the Africans, who were now rather more exhausted by slaughter than by actual fighting.

It was here that Lucius Aemilius fell in the thick of the fight after receiving several dreadful wounds, and of him we may say that if there ever was a man who did his duty by his country both all through his life and in these last times, it was he.

49.1. Elsewhere, Paullus had been seriously wounded by a slingshot early in the battle,  49.2. but he continued to attack Hannibal’s position in the centre with a tightly knit body of soldiers, sometimes even managing to reverse the tide of battle.  49.3. He was protected by a bodyguard of cavalry, but in the end they abandoned their horses, because the consul no longer had the strength to control his own. Someone is supposed to have reported to Hannibal that the consul had ordered his cavalry to dismount; to which he replied, “He might just as well have surrendered them to me in handcuffs and leg irons.”  49.4. The cavalry battle was now fought out on foot, though the defeated Romans chose to die at their posts rather than run away, while their enemy out of sheer frustration butchered those they could not force to flee, because they were continuing to deny them victory.  49.5. They did finally manage to force a few survivors to make a run for it, though they were battle weary and utterly exhausted by their wounds. The whole force was now scattered, and anyone that could recovered his horse and fled.

49.6. A military tribune called Gnaeus Lentulus was riding past, when he saw the bloodstained consul sitting on a rock.  49.7. “Lucius Aemilius Paullus,” he cried, “you are the only one whom the gods in heaven will hold blameless for today’s disaster.  49.8. Come, take my horse, while there is strength left in your body and I am here to act as your companion, supporter, and defender. Do not desecrate this dreadful battle further with a consul’s death. We have cause enough for tears of grief without that.”  49.9. The consul replied, “You are a brave man, Gnaeus Cornelius, and a good one. Bless you for it. But you have very little time to escape the enemy’s clutches; don’t waste it in futile acts of pity. Hurry!  49.10. Tell the Senate to see to Rome’s defences and strengthen them before the victorious enemy arrives. And have a quiet word for me in private with Quintus Fabius. Tell him that as long as I lived and even as I died, I never forgot his words of wisdom.  49.11. Now leave me here to breathe my last among my slaughtered soldiers. I have no desire to stand trial once again for my consulship, still less to denounce a colleague in the hope that I might protect my own good name by accusing someone else of failure.”  49.12. As they spoke, a crowd of fugitives raced by, with the enemy in hot pursuit. Without even knowing who he was, they hacked the consul to death, while Lentulus’ horse carried him off in the general confusion.

The Romans as long as they could turn and present a front on every side to the enemy, held out, but as the outer ranks continued to fall, and the rest were gradually huddled in and surrounded, they finally all were killed where they stood, among them Marcus and Gnaeus, the Consuls of the preceding year, who had borne themselves in the battle like brave men worthy of Rome. While this murderous combat was going on, the Numidians following up the flying cavalry killed most of them and unseated others. A few escaped to Venusia, among them being the Consul Gaius Terentius, who disgraced himself by his flight and in his tenure of office had been most unprofitable to his country.

117  1 Such was the outcome of the battle at Cannae between the Romans and Carthaginians, a battle in which both the victors and the vanquished displayed conspicuous bravery, as was evinced by the facts. For of the six thousand cavalry, seventy escaped to Venusia with Terentius, and about three hundred of the allied horse reached different cities in scattered groups. Of the infantry about ten thousand were captured fighting but not in the actual battle, while only perhaps three thousand escaped from the field to neighbouring towns. All the rest, numbering about seventy thousand, died bravely. Both on this occasion and on former ones their numerous cavalry had contributed most to the victory of the Carthaginians, and it demonstrated to posterity that in times of war it is better to give battle with half as many infantry as the enemy and an overwhelming force of cavalry than to be in all respects his equal. Of Hannibal's army there fell about four thousand Celts, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans and two hundred cavalry...

49.13. After that, the rout was universal. 7000 men took refuge in the smaller camp, 10,000 in the larger, while 2000 or so more fled to the village of Cannae, which lacked any fortifications and was immediately surrounded by Carthalo and his cavalry. 

49.14. Varro, the other consul, either by luck or good judgement, avoided the general mass of fugitives and reached Venusia with about 50 cavalry. 

49.15. Estimates suggest that some 45,500 infantry died that day and 2,700 cavalry, about equally divided between citizens and allies. Among the casualties were both the consuls’ quaestors, Lucius Atilius and Lucius Furius Bibaculus,  49.16. twenty nine military tribunes, and some eighty further men of consular, praetorian, or aedile rank, including Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Minucius (who had been Fabius’ Master of Horse the previous year, and consul some years earlier). These were all senators, or former holders of public office which had qualified them for the senate, and they had volunteered for service with the legions.


51.1. In his moment of victory Hannibal was surrounded by his staff, crowding round to congratulate him and urge him after such a massive success to spend the remainder of the day and the following night resting himself, and giving his exhausted soldiers time to recover.  51.2. But Maharbal, his cavalry commander would have none of it, urging him not to waste a moment. “I’ll tell you what this battle has really achieved,” he declared, “when in five days time you are feasting on the Capitol. Follow up quickly. I’ll go ahead with the cavalry,  51.3. and before they even realise we are coming, the Romans will discover we’ve arrived.”

For Hannibal it all seemed far too optimistic, an almost inconceivable possibility. He commended Maharbal for his imaginative idea, but said he needed time to think it through.  51.4 Maharbal’s reply was short and to the point. “The gods do not give all their gifts to any one man. You can win a battle, Hannibal. But you have no idea how to exploit it.”

That single day’s delay, by common consent, proved the salvation of Rome and her empire.


51.5. Next day, when morning broke, the Carthaginians turned to gathering spoils and inspecting the carnage, which even they found horrifying. Thousands of Roman soldiers lay there, infantry and cavalry scattered everywhere, united in a death which the blind chances of battle or flight had brought upon them.  51.6. A few, whose wounds had been staunched by the morning frosts, even rose from among the heaps of dead all covered in blood – only to be slaughtered there and then by their enemies.  51.7. Others were discovered, still alive, but lying there with their knees or hamstrings sliced apart, baring their necks or throats and begging their enemies to drain the rest of their blood.  51.8. Some were even found with their heads buried in the ground, having dug small pits for themselves and buried their faces in the earth, and then simply smothered themselves to death.  51.9. The most spectacular sight of allwas a Numidian soldier, still alive but lying beneath a dead Roman, with his nose and ears torn to shreds. The Roman had fought to his final breath, and when his hands could no longer hold his weapon, his anger turned to madness, and he died tearing his enemy to pieces with his teeth...

118  1 The result of the battle being as I have described, the general consequences that had been anticipated on both sides followed. The Carthaginians by this action became at once masters of almost all the rest of the coast, Tarentum immediately surrendering, while Argyrippa and some Campanian towns invited Hannibal to come to them, and the eyes of all were now turned to the Carthaginians, who had great hopes of even taking Rome itself at the first assault. The Romans on their part owing to this defeat at once abandoned all hope of retaining their supremacy in Italy, and were in the greatest fear about their own safety and that of Rome, expecting Hannibal every moment to appear. It seemed indeed as if τύχη were taking part against them in their struggle with adversity and meant to fill the cup to overflowing; for but a few days afterwards, while the city was yet panic-stricken, the commander they had sent to Cisalpine Gaul was surprised by the Celts in an ambush and he and his force utterly destroyed. Yet the Senate neglected no means in its power, but exhorted and encouraged the populace, strengthened the defences of the city, and deliberated on the situation with manly coolness. And subsequent events made this manifest. For though the Romans were now incontestably beaten and their military reputation shattered, yet by the peculiar virtues of their constitution and by wise counsel they not only recovered their supremacy in Italy and afterwards defeated the Carthaginians, but in a few years made themselves masters of the whole world.

61. How far that disaster surpassed previous ones is shown by one simple fact. Up to that day the loyalty of our allies had remained unshaken, now it began to waver, for no other reason, we may be certain, than that they despaired of the maintenance of our empire. The tribes who revolted to the Carthaginians were the Atellani, the Calatini, the Hirpini, a section of the Apulians, all the Samnite cantons with the exception of the Pentri, all the Bruttii and the Lucanians. In addition to these, the Uzentini and almost the whole of the coast of Magna Graecia, the people of Tarentum Crotona and Locri, as well as all Cisalpine Gaul.

Yet, in spite of all their disasters and the revolt of their allies, no one anywhere in Rome mentioned the word "Peace," either before the consul's return or after his arrival when all the memories of their losses were renewed. Such a lofty spirit did the citizens exhibit in those days that though the consul was coming back from a terrible defeat for which they knew he was mainly responsible, he was met by a vast concourse drawn from every class of society, and thanks were formally voted to him because he "had not despaired of the republic." Had he been commander-in-chief of the Carthaginians there was no torture to which he would not have been subjected.