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Kháng Chiến chống Mỹ

The 'Resistance War against America'

 

    

The North Vietnamese Strategy

The 'Vietnam War' is our name for what the North Vietnamese called the 'National Rescue Anti-American Resistance War' (Kháng chiến chống Mỹ cứu nước).  The name offers an insight into their aims and motives. 

In your textbook – indeed as in the textbook I wrote in 2008 – it is highly likely that the North Vietnamese tactic is described as 'guerrilla war', for example:

The Americans could easily win any pitched battle, but the Viet Cong avoided this and instead fought a guerrilla war.  They came out of the jungle to carry out acts of sabotage and sudden ambushes, and then quickly returned into the jungle.

Kelly & Lacy (2001)

It is arguable that this is not just an oversimplification, but that it is downright wrong, and it at least seriously belittles the North Vietnamese military strategy.  By 1975, the NVA had fully transformed itself from a mobile light-infantry into a well-trained, effective conventional army.

 

Dau tranh

The Vietnamese called their war strategy dau tranh, which just means 'struggle'.  At its base was the Chinese leader Mao Zedong's theory of revolution – First: win the support of the people; Second: wear down the existing government by guerrilla warfare; Third: take power by a conventional war.  But North Vietnam's  dau tranh was much more sophisticated and flexible – what we might call 'war-by-all-means'.  It involved co-ordinated efforts on the diplomatic, psychological, economic and military fronts.  

On the military front, that meant a blend of guerrilla tactics and conventional warfare.  The regular North Vietnamese Army – the NVA (or, in some books, PAVN = 'People's Army of Vietnam') and the guerrilla organisation in the South (the Vietcong) liaised closely and could switch roles as necessary.  The aim was to fight only on their own terms – to take the war to the Americans at every opportunity but, when the enemy attacked, they tended to withdraw.  There was no attempt to hold on to territory, and defeats were regarded as a learning opportunity.

Throughout the war, the Politburo was split on the best approach.  The 'Southern-firsters', urged on by the Chinese, believed they were in the final stage of the war and wanted to launch conventional attacks.  The 'Northern-firsters', taking their lead from the Soviet Union, preferred caution and diplomacy.  Vo Nguyen Giap tended to support the ''Northern-first' moderates; the influential politician Le Duan (who would become leader of Vietnam when Ho Chi Minh died) favoured the 'Southern-first' hawks. 

This tension determined the shape of the war:

Phase 1: In 1963, after the assassination of Diem, the 'Southern-firsters' convinced the Central Committee to 'go-for-broke', and in 1964 the NVA defeated the ARVN in the Battle of Ap Bac, just 44 miles from Saigon.  In 1965, however, the Americans arrived in Vietnam, and the NVA suffered heavy casualties in the battle of Ia Drang.  For the next two years, therefore, the North Vietnamese reverted to guerrilla tactics.

Phase 2: As the war sank into stalemate, the 'Southern-firsters' again seized power in the Politburo; in the 1967 ‘Anti-Party Affair’, hundreds of pro-Soviet moderates were arrested, and the Central Committee approved a 'General Offensive and Uprising'. 

Phase 3: The Tet Offensive of 1968, which was the result, is often described as the moment the U.S. lost the war ...  but the NVA and Vietcong sustained massive losses.  The result was that the North Vietnamese again were forced to revert to guerrilla tactics and small-scale attacks.

Phase 4: The collapse of U.S. resolve after 1969 encouraged another conventional attack (the Easter Offensive of 1972) ...  which was again defeated.

Phase 5: After the U.S. withdrew altogether in 1975, the NVA launched the final 'Ho Chi Minh Campaign' which captured Saigon and won the war.

   

  

Going Deeper

The following links will help you widen your knowledge:

Basic account from BBC Bitesize 

Notes by Clever Lili 

Cu Chi Tunnels

 

The Cu Chi Tunnels  - BBC Sounds

 

YouTube

A general overview of the war by Pete Jackson - really useful

A British Pathe film showing the North Vietnamese at war.

Ho Chi Min Trail - Cameron Paterson

   

 

 

Source A

 

Source B

We have to emphasize the slogan ‘Find the Americans to kill’.  On specific battlegrounds, we have to study thoroughly the methods most suited for destroying the American troops.  With the guerrilla forces encircling the American troops’ bases, we have to strongly encourage bravery in military struggling so as to heighten their resolution for killing American troops. 

The more troops the U.S. brings in, the more military bases it builds, the larger area it occupies, the more sophisticated weapons it uses, the more bomb B52 it throws, the more chemical poisons it uses, the worse the conflict between our people and them becomes, the more our people hate them.  . 

Politburo heavyweight and 'Southern-firster' Le Duan, Letter to Southern Central Department (1965).

 

North Vietnamese Tactics

POLITICAL WARFARE

  •  A Code of Conduct to win the support of the population. 

  •  Propaganda leaflets and radio to demoralise ARVN and U.S. troops.

  •  Targeted assassinations of village chiefs, policemen, and ARVN officials to destabilise South Vietnamese control. 

  •  Killings of civilians who opposed them (c.27,000 1966-71). 

  •  Tortured prisoners of war. 

   

GUERRILLA WARFARE

  •  Small groups. 

  •  Make use of the terrain (jungle, rice paddies, mountains) to stay hidden until the last moment. 

  •  No uniform → able to mingle and hide in/control the strategic hamlets. 

  •  Night operations. 

  •  Ambush/ hit-and-run (eg to Laos, where U.S. troops were not allowed to follow). 

  •  ‘Hanging onto the belt’ (close-range fighting, so that the Americans did not dare to use their artillery and planes for fear of hitting their own men). 

  •  Snipers. 

  •  ‘Sapper’ attacks to sabotage bridges, roads, supply dumps, and airstrips. 

  •  Networks of tunnels (eg the Cu Chi tunnels around Saigon) including underground hospitals, barracks & weapons factories

  •  Land mines (eg ‘bouncing Betty’ which, when you trod on it, jumped up about a metre and exploded at hip level). 

  •  Booby traps (eg trip wires & trap pits with poisoned bamboo sticks). 

  •  Unlike the Americans, Vietnamese soldiers were taught military strategy, political ideology, and how to use their own initiative. 

   

CONVENTIONAL WARFARE

  •  ‘One slow four quick’ attacks – ie : plan and prepare meticulously; then quickly advance, attack strongly, clear the battlefield, withdraw ...  leaving the enemy reeling. 

  •  Most weaponry was supplied by the USSR and included:

          ◦  AK-47 ‘Kalashnikov’ assault rifles.

          ◦  Tanks, amphibious tanks, and armoured personnel carriers. 

          ◦  Lorry-mounted field guns

          ◦  Hand-held Surface-to-Air and anti-tank missile-launchers

          ◦  Radar-guided AA guns

  •  After 1970, combined arms assaults (eg 1972 Easter Offensive, 1975 Spring Offensive). 

   

SUPPLY

  •  Chinese and Soviet weapons and funding. 

  •  Camouflaged transport, inc.  bicycles, porters, and pack animals, esp.  in rainy season. 

  •  The Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia. 

    

    

Source C

The NVA and VC began to adopt a policy of ‘hanging on to American belts’.  This policy called for communist fighters to get as close as possible to U.S. forces before opening fire.  If they were in close enough, the Americans would refrain from using lavish artillery and air support for fear of hitting their own troops.

Historian Andrew Wiest, The Vietnam War (2006).

    

Source D

There was no way we could stand up to the Americans – when they attacked we just ran away from them.  But when they turned round, we followed them…

The American’s way of fighting was to attack, then call for back-up from their planes and artillery.  We would disappear if we could, but if we couldn’t we moved very close to them, so the planes could not get at us. 

Trinh Duc, who had been a Vietcong soldier, remembering how they fought the Americans (1996):.

    

Source E

You never knew who was the enemy and who was the friend.  They all looked alike.  They all dressed alike.  They were all Vietnamese.. 

former U.S. Captain Edwin J.  Banks, speaking on the documentary, Vietnam: A Television History (1983).

 

Source F

The number of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese killed in the war has been estimated at 1 million – far higher than U.S. losses.  However this was a price that Ho Chi Minh was prepared to pay.  Whatever the casualties, there were replacement troops available.  The greatest strength of the Viet Cong fighters was that they simply refused to give in.

Ben Walsh, GCSE Modern World History (2016).

    

Source G

An ARVN propaganda cartoon of 1966.  The image on the left, with the title 'TODAY', shows North Vietnamese soldiers forcibly enlisting a civilian.  The image on the right, depicting a battlefield full of dead bodies, reads: 'TOMORROW: Why are the Viet Cong implementing a policy of compulsory conscription?

    

Consider:

1.  Make a list of the things the VietCong did which we would today label as 'war crimes'.

2.  In my 2004 book on the War, I wrote:

"The Americans were criticised for the way they waged the war, but the Viet Cong were as bad in different ways…  both sides used morally indefensible weapons.  Vietnam merely proved that you cannot have a 'civilised' war."

    Discuss with a friend.

3.  Why might Western writers subconsciously wish to downplay the brilliance of the North Vietnamese conduct of the war?

 

 

  • AQA-style Questions

      1.  Source A is a cartoon by an American whose son was fighting in the War.  How can you tell?  Explain your answer using Source A and your contextual knowledge.

      2.  How useful are Sources D and E to an historian studying North Vietnamese guerrilla tactics?

      3.  Write an account of how the Battle of Ia Drang (1965) changed North Vietnamese tactics. 

      4.  "By 1975, the NVA had fully transformed itself from a mobile light-infantry into a well-trained, effective conventional army."  How far do you agree with this statement?  Explain your answer. 

 

  • iGCSE-style Questions

      (a)  Describe TWO features of EITHER Vietcong guerrilla warfare OR the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

      (b)  How far does Source D support the evidence of Source C about the North Vietnamese policy of 'hanging onto the belts'.  Explain your answer.

      (c)  Source G suggests that the North Vietnamese leadership did not care about how many soldiers died.  How far do you agree with this interpretation?

  

  • Edexcel Questions

      1.  Give two things you can infer from Source B about the attitude of the North Vietnamese leadership to the conduct of the war.

      2.  Explain why North Vietnamese war strategies changed as the War went on. 

      3a.  How useful are Sources C and D for an enquiry into North Vietnamese guerrilla tactics. 

      3b.  Sources B and G give different views about the North Vietnamese army.  What is the main difference between these views? 

 


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