CAUSES
1. Cold War context: an Existential Threat
• 1950 = v soon after WWII → West feared global comm takeover.
• Communist scare in the US.
• US saw invasion as USSR plot → Korea = frontline in survival of democratic world.
2. Cultural psychology: slaughter or be slaughtered
• 1950s = physically aggressive society (eg executions).
• Films showed heroic violence vs faceless enemies → war seen as righteous.
3. North Korea atrocities
• North Korea repressive, brutal tactics (eg: July 1950 – killed c.5,000 in TAEJON (govt staff, police, civilians).
4. US interests
• Jan 1950: Acheson had said Korea outside US defence zone → now reversed this view.
◦ Saw Korea as vital to Jap’s safety + a matter of PRESTIGE.
◦ If US did nothing → allies lose faith, comm expands in far east.
◦ Korea also important to US commercial empire (no colonies but key TRADE routes).
5. Racism
• Bruce Cumings: many US attitudes to Asians = racist (lazy, sly, cruel).
• US saw itself as civilising “primitive peoples”.
6. MacArthur’s military assessment → political decision
• 27 June: MacArthur visited Korea → restructured ROK command.
• Ordered US bombing of NKPA airfields.
• Saw ROK collapse → told US gov to send ground troops immediately.
7. ‘Any means necessary’ – How did the UN come to back war vs North Korea?
• UN Sec-Gen TRYGVE LIE (Norwegian) sympathised w. South Korea (∵ Norway’s WWII exp).
• UN had taken responsibility for Korea (Nov 1947).
• 27 June: UN Security Council passed RESOLUTION 83 = members should help South Korea restore peace.
• USSR was BOYCOTTING UN (re Communist China issue) → couldn’t veto Res 83.
• US pressure: wrote Res 83 + Truman pushed it hard.
• Support for US in UN: many UN states feared comm, trusted USA as defender of democracy.
• Nov: Gen Assembly passed RESOLUTION 377 to act if Security Council deadlocked → passed 52–5.
• US forces were fighting from Day 2 – UN gave ‘MORAL CLOAK’ to avoid blame for risking world war.
THE NKPA ADVANCE INTO SOUTH KOREA
• US troops arrived arrogant, thinking NKPA would flee at sight of US uniform.
• NKPA paused at Seoul, then resumed advance. No ROK forces left to resist.
• 5 July – Task Force Smith at OSAN: US forces couldn’t stop NKPA tanks/ briefly slowed NKPA but then fled.
• 6 July – Battle of PYONGTAEK:
• US 34th Infantry = under-equipped, no anti-tank, no radios, v inexperienced.
• Command failures + panic → mass retreat, some soldiers froze + were shot.
• 16–20 July – Battle of TAEJON:
◦ US 24th Division: 3,602 killed/wounded + 2,962 captured (incl commander).
◦ US kept setting up lines → quickly collapsed.
• August: Recovery:
◦ More troops + tanks + anti-tank weapons + supplies arrived from Japan.
◦ USAF bombed bridges, depots, roads to disrupt NKPA supplies.
◦ US formed defensive line at Natkong River (perimeter around port of PUSAN).
◦ NKPA = exhausted → paused.
• Sept: NKPA regrouped + renewed attack → US driven back again.
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