From Weimar
to Hitler: The Rise and Fall of the first German Democracy
by
Dr
E.J. Feuchtwanger
new perspective. Volume 1. Number 1.
September 1995
Summary: Weimar democracy, which arose
from defeat and which replaced a semi-authoritarian
imperialist regime, never had very wide support. Despite
opposition from right and left the Weimar Republic survived
to years of greater internal peace from the mid- 1920s, when
the fundamental political problems were masked, until
exposure by the economic and political crises of 1929
Hitler's appointment as German Chancellor in 1933 was
arguably the most important event of the twentieth century.
Within six years it led to the vast destruction and
profound, world-wide changes of the Second World War. It is
therefore crucial for historians to explain how so violent,
barbaric and destructive a movement came to control an
advanced and civilised country. The most direct causes for
the collapse of the first German democracy must be sought in
the years between the end of the First World War and the
establishment of the Third Reich. This period can be divided
into three sections: 1918-1924, when the Weimar Republic was
set up and survived a series of severe crises; 1924-1929,
when the republic was relatively stable and prosperous; and
1929-1933, when renewed instability eventually put an end to
democracy with the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor
on 30 January 1933.
1918-1924: Defeat and New Order Survival
The defeat of 1918 hit the German public with brutal
suddenness. To the very end they had been told that victory
was within their grasp. In the spring of 1918 the German
High Command still staked all on an offensive to achieve the
breakthrough on the Western Front which had eluded them
since 1914. An all-out victory would perpetuate the
semi-authoritarian imperial regime and the privileges of its
dominant classes. In fact German resources were by 1918
hopelessly over-stretched and morale at home and in the army
had become fragile. At the end of September 1918 the High
Command had to acknowledge defeat by asking for an
armistice. This precipitated the revolution and the
overthrow of the monarchy.
The parliamentary democracy which was established in
Germany in 1918/19 was therefore the consequence of defeat
and revolution and not the deliberate choice of a majority
of the population. They hoped, however, that the removal of
the Kaiser and the adoption of parliamentary democracy would
make the Allies grant Germany a lenient peace. When the
terms of the treaty Versailles became public in May 1919
many who had briefly supported democracy turned against it.
Others, mostly the middle classes previously loyal to the
Empire, had never wanted democracy and deeply resented the
overthrow of the monarchy. They persuaded themselves that
the German army had never been defeated on the battlefield,
but had been undermined by subversion on the home front. The
men swept to power in the revolution of November 1918 were
held responsible for the collapse of civilian morale and
accused of betraying the Fatherland for their own ends. This
was the notorious 'stab-in-the-back myth'. Democracy and the
Weimar Republic were therefore never universally accepted
and suffered from a lack of legitimacy. In fair weather a
majority might go along with it, but in a time of hardship,
as in the Great Depression after 1929, they would desert it.
Why Weimar's Failure was Not Inevitable
Weimar's failure was, however, not inevitable, for the
republic survived a period of severe political and economic
crisis in its early years. The first threat came from the
left, disappointed with the results of the revolution. They
wanted a thorough-going transformation of society, as in
Russia, based on the workers' and soldiers' councils which
had spontaneously sprung up during the German revolution.
Such a system had little chance of being realised in an
advanced industrial country like Germany, where, unlike
Russia, the workers had long had the vote. The first
elections after the fall of the monarchy did not produce a
socialist majority and the SPD (Social Democratic Party of
Germany) had to govern in coalition with middle-class
parties. Some historians have blamed the Social Democrats
led by Friedrich Ebert for being too obsessed with the
threat from the left and too reliant on the old imperial
officials, particularly the officer corps and the general
staff. Without their help, however, Ebert and his colleagues
could not have fed the population, maintained law and order
and safeguarded the unity of the Reich in 1918/19.
The Treaty of Versailles was regarded in Germany as
humiliating and incapable of fulfilment. People lost sight
of the fact that it left the unified Germany created in 1870
basically intact and in the long run in a strategically
strong position, with weak neighbours on its east. Following
Versailles, disillusionment with democracy led, in March
1920, to the first attempt by right-wing nationalists to
overthrow the republic, the Kapp Putsch. At this point
pro-republican forces, the parties of the centre and the
left, were still strong enough to frustrate the coup. A
general strike played a key role in defeating the plotters.
In the next few years instability was aggravated by
accelerating inflation. The German currency had already lost
much of its value during the war and Weimar governments were
too weak to bring inflation under control. The reparations
which Germany was obliged to pay under the peace settlement,
and which were the subject of international negotiations
from 1920 onwards, gave the Reich governments no incentive
to put their finances in order. Moreover, by letting
inflation continue, the Germans managed for a time to avoid
the post-war slump that hit the other major industrial
countries, Britain and America. The French Government under
Poincar‚ felt that Germany was deliberately evading
reparations and in January 1923 occupied the Ruhr as a
'productive pledge'. In France the Versailles Treaty was
regarded as having insufficiently safeguarded her security
against German aggression and reparations provided a lever
through which the French hoped to retain some control over
Germany. The economic separation of the Ruhr from the Reich
knocked the bottom out of the German currency. By the summer
of 1923 there was hyper-inflation; wages had to be paid with
washing-baskets full of banknotes and the value of the mark
fell hourly. Economic life was in chaos. It looked as if
Germany was about to experience the disintegration she had
avoided in 1918. In Central Germany there was an attempted
Communist uprising; in Bavaria right-wing extremists, led by
Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist party, tried to
seize power.
The Nazis were one of many extreme right-wing groups
whose hallmark was strident nationalism, based on the belief
that Germans were an Aryan race, superior particularly to
the Slav peoples of Eastern Europe. Most such groups were
strongly anti-Semitic, believing that Jews were an alien
race within, conspiring against the German people through
ideologies such as liberalism and socialism, while as
promoters of international capitalism they were undermining
the economy of the country. In the social crisis of the
post-war period sections of the lower middle class, squeezed
between big business and labour and stripped of their
savings by inflation, were attracted by National Socialism,
simultaneously nationalist, anti-capitalist and
anti-Bolshevik. There were similar fascist movements in
other European countries, built around a leader who would
impose order and authority. Hitler's movement obtained local
prominence in Bavaria through his ability to give violent
expression to the resentments and hatreds of people whose
security had been shattered by defeat and revolution. In
Bavaria the authorities dealt leniently with right-wing
violence, for groups such as the Nazis might be needed
against another uprising from the extreme left. Thus, Hitler
and his movement grew, especially in the turmoil of 1923. He
was, however, not important enough to control events and in
November 1923 the Beer Hall Putsch failed ignominiously.
1924-1929: More Stability, Peace and Prosperity but
Fundamental Weaknesses Remain
At this point the situation in Germany was changing
radically for the better. Not only had all attempts to
overthrow the republic from left or right failed, the
introduction of a stable currency began the process of
economic recovery. A settlement of the reparations problem,
the Dawes Plan, was negotiated in 1924. The French
occupation of the Ruhr was ended in 1925 and the Locarno
Treaty created a greater sense of security in Europe.
Germany's western borders were declared final, while her
eastern borders could only be changed by agreement, not
force. The German representative in these negotiations was
Gustav Stresemann, Chancellor for three crucial months in
1923 and then foreign minister until his death in October
1929, but he was always under virulent attack from the
nationalist opposition.
The middle 1920s have often been called the golden years
of Weimar. Germany regained something like her pre-war
standard of living. The arts flourished, with names that are
still famous today, Brecht, Kurt Weill, the Threepenny
Opera, the Bauhaus. The real strength of the German
recovery is, however, still a matter of debate, for
political and economic weaknesses continued. It was
difficult under the Weimar political system to produce
stable government. This is often attributed to the large
number of political parties and the need to form coalitions
which proved short-lived. The blame for this is put on the
electoral system of strict proportional representation,
which allowed even small parties to get a few members
elected and immediately reflected, without any barrier, the
rise and fall of parties. It would not, however, have been
possible to introduce in Germany a first-past-the-post
electoral system leading to a two-party system along British
lines. Five or six major parties had survived from the
imperial period and coalition government was unavoidable.
Part of the problem was that the parties found it difficult
to co-operate. This in turn was aggravated by the existence
of extremist parties on the right and the left. It was
difficult for the SPD, usually the largest party, to
enterinto coalition with the middle-class parties, for its
working-class voters might then defect to the Communist
party, which always had at least a quarter of the left-wing
vote. The irreconcilable division of the left was one of the
reasons why the Nazis eventually took over with such ease.
The strength of the German economy in the mid-1920s is
also still in dispute. It was very dependent on the in-flow
of foreign, mainly American capital. The republic tried to
meet aspirations for social welfare, for example through the
introduction of comprehensive unemployment insurance in
1927. The employers complained that industry was in
consequence burdened by heavy social costs and rendered
uncompetitive. People who had lost their savings in the
great inflation could not be effectively compensated and
remained resentful. By 1927 agricultural prices started to
fall internationally and German farmers were hard-pressed.
Nevertheless, the democratic regime seemed firmly
established by 1928. In the Reichstag elections of that year
the SPD, the party most closely linked with Weimar, polled
nearly 30 per cent of the vote. In contrast the Nazi party,
for the first time contesting a national election on its
own, obtained only 2.6 percent and 12 seats out of 491.
There was, however, a fragmentation of parties in the centre
ground of politics and this facilitated the Nazi
breakthrough when crisis struck again.
1929-1933: Reduced
Support for Centre Parties
The onset of the final crisis of the Weimar Republic is
often linked to the Wall Street crash of October 1929,
marking the beginning of a world-wide slump of unprecedented
severity. In fact the German economy had already shown signs
of sluggishness earlier in 1929. Political repercussions in
Germany arose in the first place because higher levels of
unemployment made the recently established national
insurance scheme insolvent. The parties could not agree how
to meet the deficit, the right refusing to sanction higher
taxes, the left unwilling to see the burden on the workers
and the unemployed rise. In March 1930 the broad coalition
headed by the SPD fell apart. The new Chancellor, Heinrich
Brüning, was given the right to use the President's
emergency powers, under article 48 of the Weimar
Constitution, to issue decrees. The Reichstag was thus
by-passed and was only left with the option of voting
Brüning's decrees down. When it did so in July 1930, the
President, Hindenburg, sanctioned the dissolution of the
Reichstag. Elections had therefore to be held in September
1930, when the Nazi party received eight times as many votes
as previously. It became the second-largest party, with 18.3
per cent of the vote and 107 out of 577 deputies.
A great deal of research has gone into explaining the
electoral upsurge of the Nazi movement, which by the summer
of 1932 had reached a peak of 37.3 percent of the vote and
230 out of 608 Reichstag deputies, making it much the
largest party. In the past historians have emphasised the
irrational nature of this explosion, stressing the
ruthlessness of Nazi propaganda, the appeal of Hitler's mass
meetings, all signs of profound social-psychological
disturbance. Recent electoral analyses have shown that the
Nazis made their biggest gains among the Protestant middle
class. Roman Catholic voters normally attached to the two
Catholic parties retained their previous loyalties. The
working-class voters of the two left-wing parties, the
Social Democrats and the Communists, also proved relatively
immune to the Nazi appeal. From this it can be argued that
the various middle-class parties, already fragmented in
1928, were no longer seen as capable of protecting the
interests of their voters. The Nazis, on the other hand,
appealed effectively to the most diverse groups, including a
large number of working-class voters not living in big
industrial cities and not normally attached to the two
left-wing parties. The Nazis claimed to be a movement, not a
party, capable of ending the divisiveness of party and
class. Before the incompatibility of their offers to
different sections became obvious they had acquired total
power.
Economic Crisis: Political Misjudgement
The steep decline of the German economy after 1929 was an
essential pre-condition for the success of the Nazis, though
not in itself a sufficient explanation. Historians still
debate whether the German governments of the time,
particularly that of Brüning, could have pursued different
policies to mitigate the slump. The policies pursued were
deflationary, namely the government itself was constantly
cutting expenditure to balance its declining revenue, thus
adding to the downward pressures in the economy. The
alternative would have been to pump money into the economy,
the policies that came later to be associated with the
British economist John Maynard Keynes. Credit creation would
in practice have been difficult. Till the summer of 1931 the
slump did not seem to be of exceptional severity. Nobody
wanted to slide back into the devastating inflation
experienced only a few years earlier and largely caused by
the unrestrained printing of money. The reflationary
measures hesitatingly adopted in 1932 did not become
effective until Hitler was in power and then benefited him.
In the final stages of the crisis the key decisions lay
with the president Hindenburg, aged 85, and his advisers.
Among them the most important was General Kurt von
Schleicher, who represented the army. Confronted with the
apparently irresistibly rising Nazi tide these men felt that
Hitler would have to be brought into government, but without
handing him the unlimited power he was demanding. Important
interest groups, such as the major industrialists and the
big landowners, wanted a stable government, which could not
be established without the Nazis. Hitler was, however, not
merely the puppet of big business, a Marxist argument not
now generally accepted. In May 1932 Hindenburg dropped
Brüning and was persuaded by Schleicher to appoint Papen as
chancellor. The latter had virtually no support, was unable
to strike a deal with Hitler and only survived by repeated
dissolutions of the Reichstag. In the second of the
resulting elections, in November 1932, the Nazis suffered a
severe electoral setback, their vote dropping by over two
million or 4 per cent. This lends weight to the argument
that Hitler could have been kept out of power. Schleicher
himself took office as chancellor in December 1932, but,
with the Nazis still the largest party, could not find a
stable basis for his government. Papen, originally his
creature, felt aggrieved at being displaced, and by late
January 1933 had persuaded Hindenburg that he could make the
deal with Hitler that would at last bring the Nazi leader
'tamed' into the government. The Hitler cabinet formed on 30
January 1933 contained only two Nazis besides Hitler and it
looked as if Papen, supported by other conservative
non-Nazis, was the dominant figure. This swiftly proved an
illusion. With the levers of power in his hands, and with a
massive popular, and in part revolutionary, movement behind
him, Hitler quickly demolished all restraints on his total
control. He had achieved a revolution under a cloak of
legality.
Hitler did not seize power, but was given it by a
back-stairs intrigue. If so many German voters had not
supported him he would never have been in the running. Even
then it was not inevitable that he should become Chancellor,
but few fully realised how catastrophic this would prove.
Words
and concepts to note
Reich: the union of German states (Under). The first
Reich was the Holy Roman Empire, which ended in 1806. The
second Reich was the united Germany established in 1871.
Hitler called his regime the Third Reich.
Reich Chancellor: title of the Prime Minister of the
unified Germany from 1871.
councils; in German Räte. These were set up spontaneously
in many German towns and cities (workers' councils) and in
the army (soldiers' councils) during the Revolution of 1918.
The Left wanted to make them, rather than a parliament
elected by universal suffrage, the basis of the new society
to be created by the revolution. They were influenced by the
role played by soviets in the Russian Revolution.
repartions: the payments in money and in kind Germany was
obliged to make to her former enemies to compensate for the
damage done to them and their citizens in the war. These
payments were later regulated by two international
agreements, the Dawes Plan of 1924 and the Young Plan of
1929. The Great Depression brought them to an end in 1932.
inflation: too much money chasing too few goods - prices
rise. The extreme inflation experienced in Germany in
1922/23 is usually called hyper-inflation.
Deflation: the opposite - too little money chasing too
many goods, hence, although prices fall, there is not enough
purchasing power to keep the economy running at capacity.
This was the situation experienced in Germany from 1929.
Reflation is the attempt, by creating credit or simply by
printing money, to overcome the slump associated with
deflation.
Protestant. in Germany the Protestant, i.e. non-Roman
Catholic, part of the population is in the majority. Most
German Protestants belong to churches preaching the
doctrines of Martin Luther, the German reformer of the
sixteenth century, and are therefore often called Lutherans.
The areas mainly inhabited by Roman Catholics are the
Rhincland and most of Bavaria.
The
German parties and their ideologies
Social Democracy, Communism and Marxism. In Germany the
Social Democratic Party (SPD), the largest party before
1914, had become a party committed to reform. Its leaders
were catapulted into power in 1918. The left wing of German
socialists became consolidated into the Communist Party (KPD)
and by the early 1920s followed the policy lines laid down
from Moscow. While the SPD was the party most fully
associated with the establishment and maintenance of the
democratic republic, the KPD was strongly anti-republican.
In the final years of Weimar the KID concentrated most of
its fire on the SPI), believing that even if this helped to
bring Hitler to power his rule would be brief and end in the
inevitable overthrow of capitalism predicted by Marx. People
on the right-wing of German poltics nevertheless tended to
lump SPD and KPD together as Marxists.
National Socialism, Fascism and Conservative Nationalism.
The National Socialist Workers' Party (NSDAP), Nazis for
short, had many things in common with fascism in other
countries. National Socialism became, however, much more
important and more radical than other varieties of fascism,
so that the general label 'fascist' hardly describes it
adequately. It must also be distinguished from the
traditional and conservative forms of German nationalism,
though most German conservative nationalists tended to
support Nazism and Hitler once they were in power and
successful. As opposed to conservative nationalism, National
Socialism was a revolutionary and totalitarian doctrine.
Questions to consider
• Why were the left and and the right, rather than the
parties in the centre, relatively stronger in Germany?
• How important was the Army in the Nazi achievement of
power?
• How important were policies, rather than Hitler's
personality or the circumstances, for the extent of support
for the Nazis, 1929-33?
Further Reading. EJ. Feuchtwanger, From Weimar to
Hitler. Germany 1918-33 (2nd edn., 1995). J. Hiden,
Germany and Europe 1919-1939 (2nd edn., 1993). I.
Kershaw (ed.), Weimar: Why did German democracy fail?
(1990). I. Kershaw, Hitler (1991). A.J. Nicholls,
Weimar and the Rise of Hitler (3rd edn., 1991). J.
Noakes and G. Pridham (eds.), Nazism, 1919-1945. A
Documentary Reader. Vol. L The Rise to Power (1983).
D.J.K. Peukert, The Weirnar Republic. The Crisis of
Classical Modernity (1992).
From Weimar To Hitler: The Rise and Fall of the first
German Democracy by E.J. Feuchtwanger. © new perspective
1995
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