JM Keynes on Clemenceau
John
Maynard Keynes was one of the British delegates at the Versailles
Conference. This is what he said about Clemenceau: |
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Clemenceau
was by far the most eminent member of the Council of Four, and he had
taken the measure of his colleagues. He alone both had an idea and had
considered it in all its consequences. His age, his character, his wit,
and his appearance joined to give him objectivity and a defined outline in
an environment of confusion. One could not despise Clemenceau or dislike
him, but only take a different view as to the nature of civilized man, or
indulge, at least, a different hope.... |
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At
the Council of Four he wore a square-tailed coat of a very good, thick
black broadcloth, and on his hands, which were never uncovered, gray suede
gloves; his boots were of thick black leather, very good, but of a country
style, and sometimes fastened in front, curiously, by a buckle instead of
laces. His seat in the room in the President's house, where the regular
meetings of the Council of Four were held (as distinguished from their
private and unattended conferences in a smaller chamber below), was on a
square brocaded chair in the middle of the semicircle facing the
fire-place, with Signor Orlando on his left, [American] President [Woodrow
Wilson] next by the fire-place, and the Prime Minister [of England, Lloyd
George] opposite on the other side of the fire-place on his right. |
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He
carried no papers and no portfolio, and was [not] attended by any personal
secretary, though several French ministers and officials appropriate to
the particular matter in hand would be present round him. His walk, his
hand, and his voice were not lacking in vigor, but he bore nevertheless,
especially after the attempt upon him, the aspect of a very old man
conserving his strength for important occasions. He spoke seldom, leaving
the initial statement of the French case to his ministers or officials; he
closed his eyes often and sat back in his chair with an impassive face of
parchment, his gray-gloved hands clasped in front of him. A short
sentence, decisive or cynical, was generally sufficient, a question... or
a display of obstinacy reinforced by a few words in a piquantly delivered
English. But speech and passion were not lacking when they were wanted,
and the sudden outburst of words, often followed by a fit of deep coughing
from the chest, produced their impression rather by force and surprise
than by persuasion.... |
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He
felt about France what Pericles felt of Athens -- unique value in her,
nothing else mattering; but his theory of politics was Bismarck's. He had
one illusion -- France; and one disillusion -- mankind, including
Frenchmen, and his colleagues not least. His principles for the peace can
be expressed simply. In the first place, he was a foremost believer in the
view of German psychology that the German understands and can understand
nothing but intimidation, that he is without generosity or remorse in
negotiation, that there is no advantage he will not take of you, and no
extent to which he will not demean himself for profit, that he is without
honor, pride, or mercy. Therefore you must never negotiate with a German
or conciliate him; you must dictate to him. On no other terms will he
respect you, or will you prevent him from cheating you. But it is doubtful
how far he thought these characteristics peculiar to Germany, or whether
his candid view of some other nations was fundamentally different. |
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His
philosophy had, therefore, no place for "sentimentality" in
international relations. Nations are real things, of whom you love one and
feel for the rest indifference -- or hatred. The glory of the nation you
love is a desirable end -- but generally to be obtained at your neighbor's
expense. The politics of power are inevitable, and there is nothing very
new to learn about this war or the end it was fought for; England had
destroyed, as in each preceding century, a trade rival; a mighty chapter
had been closed in the secular struggle between the glories of Germany and
of France. Prudence required some measure of lip service to the
"ideals" of foolish Americans and hypocritical Englishmen; but
it would be stupid to believe that there is much room in the world, as it
really is, for such affairs as the League of Nations, or any sense in the
principle of self-determination except as an ingenious formula for
rearranging the balance of power in one's own interests. |
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These,
however, are generalities. In tracing the practical details of the peace,
which he thought necessary for the power and the security of France, we
must go back to the historical causes which had operated during his
lifetime. Before the Franco-German war the populations of France and
Germany were approximately equal; but the coal and iron and shipping of
Germany were in their infancy, and the wealth of France was greatly
superior.... |
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But
in the intervening period the relative position had changed completely. By
1914 the population of Germany was nearly 70 percent in excess of that of
France; she had become one of the first manufacturing and trading nations
of the world; her technical skill and her means for the production of
future wealth were unequalled. France on the other hand had a stationary
or declining population, and, relatively to others, had fallen seriously
behind in wealth and in the power to produce it. In spite, therefore, of
France's victorious issue from the present struggle (with the aid, this
time, of England and America), her future position remained precarious in
the eyes of one who took the view that European civil war is to be
regarded as a normal, or at least a recurrent, state of affairs for the
future, and that the sort of conflicts between organized Great Powers
which have occupied the past hundred years will also engage the next.... |
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From
the belief that essentially the old order does not change, being based on
human nature which is always the same... the policy of France and of
Clemenceau followed logically. For a peace of magnanimity or of fair and
equal treatment, based on such "ideology" as the Fourteen Points
of the President, could only have the effect of shortening the interval of
Germany's recovery and hastening the day when she will once again hurl at
France her greater numbers and her superior resources and technical
skill.... |
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So
far as possible, therefore, it was the policy of France to set the clock
back and to undo what, since 1870, the progress of Germany had
accomplished. By loss of territory and other measures her population was
to be curtailed; but chiefly the economic system, upon which she depended
for her new strength, the vast fabric built upon iron, coal, and
transport, must be destroyed.... |
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Excerpts from The Economic
Consequences of the Peace by John Maynard Keynes (1919) on http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/ess_keynesversailles.html |
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